Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis by Kai A. Konrad
ALTRUISM AND ENVY IN CONTESTS: AN
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE SYMBIOSIS
KAI A. KONRAD
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 825
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE
DECEMBER 2002
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 825
ALTRUISM AND ENVY IN CONTESTS:
AN EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE SYMBIOSIS
Abstract
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better
than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and
envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is
evolutionarily stable.
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I thank Helmut Bester and a referee for very helpful comments. The usual caveat
applies.1 Introduction
Piecemeal evidence suggests that altruism but also envy are widespread phe-
nomena.1 They refer to the concept that an individual cares about the well-
being of another individual. Whether the individual is altruistic or envious
depends on the sign of this caring. Altruism and envy provide incentives for
individuals to deviatefrom whatis sometimes called their narrowself-interest
and to do things because they a¤ect the well-being of other individuals.
Consider, for instance, altruismandenvy among participants in acontest.
When two players contest for a prize that is allocated to the player who has
made the highest e¤ort, they know that their e¤ort also a¤ects the win
probability of their opponent. Accordingly, an altruist is less interested in
winning, and an envious person may be more interested in winning than a
narrowly self-interested individual.
Similar to Bester and Güth (1998), we distinguish between utility func-
tions that describe an ordering of outcomes according to the individualsz
preferences, and their material payo¤s. Utility and material payo¤ are iden-
tical for a narrowly self-interested individual (i.e., someone who is free of
altruism or envy). They di¤er for altruists and for envious individuals. The
distinction between utility and material payo¤ is inspired by sociobiology.
There, material payo¤ determines the reproductive ⁄tness of an individual
and may di¤er from the individualzs subjective feelings of well-being.
Intuitively, altruistic or envious individuals should achieve a lower ex-
pected material payo¤ than individuals who are not altruistic or envious. In
this paper we show that an equilibrium exists in which a share of agents is
1For a broader discussion of the economics of envy and a brief literature survey see,
e.g., Mui (1995). Altruism has been discussed even more widely. Key references are Becker
(1974, 1976), Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) and Bruce and Waldman (1990).
1altruistic toward their opponent in a contest, and another share of agents is
envious, such that the material payo¤s of both the envious and the altruistic
players are strictly higher than in a situation in which emotions like envy
and altruism are both absent.
Further, we consider the evolutionary stability of such equilibria. Evo-
lutionary stability of altruism has been considered in the context of private
provision of public goods. Bergstrom (1995) andBergstrom and Stark (1993)
consider a particular e¤ect of altruism between siblings that may stabilize
altruism. When an individual grows up in a group of siblings, he may do
better as an egoist than as an altruist. However, an egoist will have o¤spring
that consists of egoists, whereas altruists have o¤spring that consists of al-
truists. Hence, the o¤spring of altruists will do better as a group than the
o¤spring of an egoist. Lohmann, Oechssler and Wärneryd (2001) consider a
di¤erent, group-selection argument.2
Bester and Güth (1998) consider individuals that are matched pairwise
and are forced toplay some prisonersz dilemmagame. Individuals canobserve
whether their match is an altruist or an egoist. Due to their altruism they
treat altruists di¤erently from how they treat narrowly sel⁄sh individuals,
2In Lohmann, Oechssler and Wärneryd (2001) altruists are characterized by a higher
willingness to contribute to a group-speci⁄c public good. Randomly matched groups with
(at least one) altruist do better than groups without altruists. Because altruists make the
contributions to the public good, their ⁄tness is lower than that of a non-altruist from
the same group. However, the altruistsz ⁄tness can be higher than the average ⁄tness of a
randomly selected non-altruist who may be allocated to a group that may or may not have
an altruist. This is the case if the share of altruists is very low, because in this case non-
altruists are likely to be in groups in which no altruist is present. And, as individuals are
randomly matched in each period, this average ⁄tness is the relevant one for non-altruists
to compare it with an altruistzs ⁄tness.
2internalizing part of the mutual bene⁄ts of cooperation. They show that
this strategic e¤ect is su¢cient to stabilize a population in which individuals
are altruists. Their approach is di¤erent, but the result is much in line with
Frankzs (1987, 1988) analysis ofthe commitment value of particular emotions
like hate, love, or altruism.
Both in the approaches by Frank (1987, 1988) and by Bester and Güth
(1998) the assumption is crucial for the evolutionary stability of altruism
that the true type of a co-player can be observed, at least with some strictly
positive probability. We depart from this assumption and consider a set-up
in which a player cannot observe the co-playerzs type. A playerzs own type
(envious or altruistic) is strictly private information. The fact that altruism
canbe evolutionarily stable in this incomplete information framework reveals
that a di¤erent mechanism to stabilize altruism is at work. Altruism and
envy are optimal behavior given that co-players show the opposite type of
behavior. Altruism pays if co-players are envious, and envy pays if co-players
are altruists. The relationship between these types has the character of a
symbiosis.
Inthe framework considered here apopulationwitha givenmix ofenvious
and altruistic individuals can be invaded by a narrowly sel⁄sh population.
Accordingly, the result may seem weaker than, for instance, the results in
Bester and Güth (1998). However, the paper also considers much weaker
assumptions regarding individualsz information about their co-playersz pref-
erences. Also the emphasis of this paper is di¤erent: the paper reveals an
interesting relationship between altruism and envy: symbiosis. We analyse
this relationship in an important but speci⁄c type of interaction: individuals
are randomly matched and enter a pairwise contest: they spend e¤ort to
win a prize and the contestantzs win probability is a function of his and his
3opponentzs e¤ort.
The paper proceeds asfollows. Firstwe analysethecontestwithtwo types
of contestants and incomplete information. The two types can be interpreted
as altruists and as players who are envious about the opponent winning the
prize. For this analysis the probability beliefs of the two contestants about
their opponentzs type are considered exogenous and symmetric.3 Then we
consider this contest game as the state game in the evolutionary game. We
show that, for given degrees of altruism and envy, there is an evolutionarily
stable equilibrium share of altruistic and envious players, whereas a pop-
ulation that consists of altruists only (or envious individuals only) can be
invaded by envious (altruistic) individuals.
2 Contests with altruism and envy
Consider the following state game. There is an in⁄nitely large set I of players
with measure 1, called the population. Individuals from this set are pairwise
randomly matched. Matched players (say, 1 and 2) enter a contest. In this
contest players make simultaneous contest e¤orts e1 and e2. The player who
chooses the higher e¤ort is awarded a prize that has a material value equal
to B, which is the same for both players. The prize is allocated according to
the ¢ip of a coin in case both players make the same e¤ort, where the e¤orts
and the prize are measured in units of a homogenous universal good. The
expected amount of this good obtained net of contest e¤ort by player 1 is
called the material payo¤ of player 1 and is equal to
¼1 = p1(e1;e2)B ¡ e1 , (1)
3A few papers that consider contests with incomplete information are Glazer and Hassin






1 for e1 > e2
1=2 for e1 = e2
0 for e1 < e2
, (2)
and similarly for player 2 with p2 = 1¡ p1. For instance, the material payo¤
could be the playerzs expected income net of contest expenditure. It would
also be the payo¤ of a risk-neutral player whois neither envious nor altruistic,
but is what is sometimes called narrowly sel⁄sh. A di¤erent consideration
motivating this de⁄nition is that, in a natural environment the material pay-
o¤ is what determines the probability of survival and reproductive success
(reproductive ⁄tness) of a player.
In addition to the material payo¤ in (1), emotions such as altruism or
envy may determine individualsz subjective well-being or utility. Consider
player 1 in the contest. If he is an altruist his utility is
UA = p1B +(1 ¡ p1)®B ¡ e1, (3)
with ® 2 (0;1) and he chooses e¤ort to maximize this utility. The altruist
has some pleasure even if his opponent wins the prize. However, this pleasure
is only ® times the pleasure he has if the prize is awarded to himself. The
constant ® is the altruism-weight and is considered exogenous throughout
the paper. This valuation must be distinguished from the material payo¤
(1). The altruistzs utility can be re-written as
UA ´ ®B + p1VA ¡ e1; with VA ´ (1 ¡ ®)B. (4)
Since ®B is a constant with respect to e¤ort choices, an altruist acts as if
the prize he can win in the contest is VA and somewhat smaller than B.
Alternatively, player 1 may be envious. He su¤ers if his opponent wins
the prize. His utility function is p1B ¡ (1 ¡ p1)¯B ¡ e1 with ¯ 2 (0;1) the
5weight of envy in the playerzs objective function and can be written as
UE ´ ¡¯B +p1VE ¡ e1 with VE ´ (1+ ¯)B. (5)
The term ¡¯B is irrelevant for the playersz e¤ort choices. An envious player
acts as if the prize he can win in the contest is somewhat larger than B.
In what follows we assume that players either exhibit altruism or envy,
with given parameters ® and ¯. We solve for the equilibrium e¤ort choices in
contest games in which two players meet. Each player knows whether he is
an altruist or an envious person, but does not know the type of his opponent.
However, the share of altruists in the population, and the random matching
process are common knowledge. Hence, each player knows that his opponent
is an altruist with probability ° and envious with probability (1 ¡ °). In
the contest each player chooses an e¤ort that maximizes his utility, given
the playerzs expectations about the other playerzs choice. The equilibrium
contest e¤orts are necessarily in mixed strategies and are characterized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a contest with the contest success function (2) with
two contestants. A contestant is an altruist with altruism weight ® or is en-
vious with envy weight ¯. Each contestant knows his type and knows that
the other contestant is a random draw from a population I with a share °
of altruists and a share (1 ¡ °) of players exhibiting envy. The cumulative





0 for e · 0
e=(°VA) for e 2 (0;°VA)







0 for e · °VA
(e ¡ °VA)=[(1¡ °)VE)] for e 2 (°VA;°VA+ (1¡ °)VE)
1 for e ¸ °VA+ (1¡ °)VE
(7)
for envious players constitute the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The contest equilibrium for the case of incomplete information has
been characterized in more general terms by Amann and Leininger (1996) for
thecase of acontinuous distribution oftypes without mass points. The result
in Proposition 1 is for a binary distribution of types, but could be derived
along similar lines. It is straightforward to verify that (6) and (7) constitute
an equilibrium. Suppose player 2 who is an altruist with probability ° and
envious with probability (1 ¡ °) follows these strategies, depending on his
type. If player 1 is an altruist, he has utility EUA = ®B for all choices
of e¤ort eA 2 [0;°VA] and lower expected utility for any eA > °VA. If
player 1 is envious, he has utility equal to EUE = °(VE ¡ VA) ¡ ¯B for all
eE 2 [°VA;°VA + (1 ¡ °)VE], and lower utility for all non-negative e¤ort
choices outside this interval.
For uniqueness, we only give a heuristic argument that also helps to make
this equilibrium outcome moreintuitive. It is easy to see that the equilibrium
must be in mixed strategies4 with no mass points other than (possibly) at
4Suppose the equilibrium were in pure strategies. Let (e¤
1;e¤
2) be such an equilibrium.
Clearly, e¤
1 = e¤
2 = 0 is not an equilibrium. Let e¤
1 > 0: Then the optimal e¤ort choice
of contestant 2 is e2(e¤
1) = 0 or e2(e¤
1) = e¤
1 + ² for small but positive ². Then player 1zs
choice of e¤
1 > 0 is not his best e¤ort choice. If e2 = 0, player 1 can do better by any
7e = 0.5
Consider an altruistzs expected utility from some e¤ort choice: EUA =
°VAFA(eA)+ (1¡ °)VAFE(eA)+ ®B ¡ eA. A marginal increase in his e¤ort




A(eA) + (1¡ °)VAF0
E(eA) ¡ 1 = 0. (8)
Similarly, an envious person is indi¤erent as regards a marginal increase in




A(eE) + (1¡ °)VEF0
E(eE) ¡ 1 = 0. (9)
Equations (8) and (9) are incompatible: d
deEUA < d
deEUE for any given e¤ort
level e = eA = eE. Hence, envious players always choose higher e¤ort than
altruistic players.
Making use of this result, (8) reduces to F 0
A(e) = 1
°VA in some range, e 2
[0;DA], and, from (9), for envious persons, F0
E = 1
(1¡°)VE in some range, e 2
[DA;DE]. This shows that the e¤ort choices must be uniformly distributed
along the respective intervals. It remains to determine these intervals.
Note that there is also no mass point at eA = 0: If an altruist spends
exactly zero e¤ort, his expected utility is
°VA
2 FA(0). Comparison of this
utility with the utility for eA = 0+² for ² ! 0 requires that FA(0) = 0 in the
choice e1 2 (0;e¤
1). If e2 = e¤
1 + ², then either e1 = 0 or e1 = e2 + ² yields higher utility
than e¤
1.
5Mass points for e > 0 can be ruled out by the following reasoning (Baye, Kovenock
and deVries 1996). Suppose player 2 has a mass point at ^ e > 0. Then any e¤ort e1 2
[^ e;^ e ¡ ±] has lower utility for player 1 than, e.g., e1 = ^ e + ±, for su¢ciently small postive
±. Accordingly, player 1 never chooses e¤ort from this interval. This in turn makes e2 = ^ e
suboptimal for player 2. Player 2zs utility is higher, for instance, for e2 = ^ e¡±. Therefore,
player 2 cannot have a mass point at ^ e in the equilibrium.
8equilibrium. Note also that, for reasons analogous to the ones that rule out
mass points at some e > 0, F0
A(e) > 0 for e = 0. Further, an altruist must be
indi¤erent between bidding DA or 0. If he bids DA he spends e¤ort equal to
DA and wins with probability ° a prize equal to VA: he wins if the opponent
is an altruist, because altruists make bids lower than DA with probability 1,
and he loses if the opponent is envious, because envious players make bids
higher than DA with probability 1, and ° is precisely the probability that
the opponent is an altruist. If he bids zero he never wins but has no e¤ort.
Hence, °VA ¡ DA = 0 must hold and this yields DA = °VA which, together
with F 0
A(e) = 1=(°VA) for eA 2 [0;DA] determines (6).
Further, DE = °VA+ (1 ¡ °)VE can be found as the implicit solution of
RDE
DA 1=[(1 ¡ °)VE]de, using DA = °VA. This concludes the proof. ¤
Proposition 1 describes the two typesz mixed equilibrium strategies. For
° = 0 or ° = 1 the equilibrium converges to the equilibrium of the symmetric
⁄rst-price all-pay auction as in Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996). In the
incompleteinformationequilibrium, for ° 2 (0;1), bids ofthetypes aresorted
according to the order of their valuations of the prize. This parallels the
results in Amann and Leininger (1996) who consider a smooth distribution
of types. The equilibrium c.d.f.zs in Proposition 1 can be used to calculate
the expected values of utility: EUA = ®B for altruists and EUE = °(VE ¡
VA) ¡ ¯B for envious players.











9It is interesting to contrast the payo¤s of the contest game with envious
and altruistic players with the payo¤s of the same type of contest if all
players behave narrowly sel⁄sh and simply maximize their material payo¤s.
¼A = ¼E = 0 for ® = ¯ = 0. Note also that altruism, but not envy is needed
to generate positive payo¤s.6
In this contest, the share of altruists determines whether the material
payo¤ of altruists is higher or lower than envious playersz payo¤. In a next
step we will assume that populations at a given stage consist of given shares
of altruistic and envious players that behave as characterized in Proposition
1. However, the shares of altruists and envious players may be determined
endogenously. For instance, if one type of preference systematically yields a
higher equilibrium material payo¤ than the other, it seems to be plausible
that the share of this type in the population increases. If this process runs
for some time, the whole population may consist of one type, and the mutual
advantage of altruists and envious players from a heterogenous population
may disappear. Alternatively, there may be some kind of predator-prey equi-
librium in which a population is stabilized in a situation in which a share
of individuals is altruistic and the other share of the population is envious.
This question is addressed in the next section.
6For complete information (observability of onezs opponentzs type) the material payo¤s
in the equilibrium can be calculated using the results of Baye, Kovenock and deVries











2 ]+ (1¡ °)
B¡VE
2 . Hence, the outcome
is qualitatively similar. However, we consider the incomplete information case in order to
highlight that it is not the di¤erential treatment that altruists and egoists receive that will
stabilize altruism.
103 The population game
The contest game in section 2 can be seen as a single stage game in a dy-
namic (evolutionary) context in which the share of altruists is endogenous
and changes according to the relative success of envious players compared
to altruists, measured by their relative material payo¤s and we can ask the
question whether there is a distribution of types that emerges in the long run
if the shares grow according to some monotonic evolutionary dynamics.
Note that the zindirectz evolutionary approach is analysed here: individu-
als behave fully rational given their own preferences, but evolutionary selec-
tion operates onthe set of feasible preferences that de⁄ne the ztypesz, and the
⁄tness of a particular preference type is determined by the material payo¤
which this type earns given the population shares of types, and given that
each individual of each type behaves fully rationally.7
Consider again the set I with a continuum of players with mass 1 - the
population. Suppose the contest game with the equilibrium that is char-
acterized in Proposition 1 is repeatedly played in this population: in each
round all players are randomly matched and play a contest as in section 2.
There are two feasible types of players: individuals who have altruist pref-
erences and maximize their expected utility as in (4) in the contest, and
envious individuals who maximize (5). Let °t and 1 ¡ °t be the population
shares of altruists and envious individuals in a given period t: Suppose that
typesz growth rates are described by some monotonic evolutionary process
where typesz growth rates positively depend on their average period material
payo¤s. The following proposition holds:
7Güth and Yaari (1992), Bester and Güth (1998) and Huck and Oechssler (1999) and
others have used this approach. Some detailed explanations and comparisons to a direct
approach in which types are de⁄ned by their strategies is in Bester and Güth (1998).
11Proposition 2 There are three stationary distributions of altruists and envi-
ous persons if typesz growth rates positively depend on their average material









Starting from some °0 2 (0;1), only the stationary distribution °¤ is reached
in the long run. The material payo¤ of each player in this equilibrium is
¼¤ =






The stationarity of ° = 0 and ° = 1 is obvious. Consider now °¤. The
material payo¤ of an altruist is equal to ¼A = °(B¡VA)=2. The payo¤ of an
envious person is ¼E = B
1+°
2 ¡ °VA ¡
1¡°
2 VE. These functions are depicted
in Figure 1. For ° 2 (0;1) the share of altruists grows for ° < ¯=(®+¯) and
decreases for ° > ¯=(®+¯) and stays constant for ° = ¯=(®+¯) ´ °¤. The
value of ¼¤ is con⁄rmed by substituting °¤ in ¼A or ¼E. ¤
Intuitively, egoists and altruists both gain in their material payo¤s from
the existence of other altruists, because altruists do not spend much e¤ort
and leave some rent for their rivals. This gain is even larger for envious
individuals, because their envy makes them aggressive in the contest. This
yields an advantage for envious players in a population that consists over-
whelmingly of altruists. However, an envious individualzs material payo¤ is
more negative than an altruistzs payo¤ if they contest against another envi-
ous rival. Hence, envious individuals do worse than altruists in a population
with a large share of envious people.
Ina society whichconsists of altruists and envious persons, in whichsocial
interaction takes the form of a contest neither the group of altruists nor the












Figure 1: Payoﬀ Diﬀerences and Evolutionary Dynamics
depend on material payoﬀs. Instead, there is a natural balance between the
share of altruists and the share of envious individuals at which the material
payoﬀs of both types are just equal, and to which the population would return
if, for some exogenous reason, the share of altruists were changed. Note also
that populations which consist of pure altruists (γ =1 ) or of purely envious
individuals (γ =0 ) could be successfully invaded by envious or altruistic
mutants.
Figure 1 also reveals the comparative static properties of the stationary
distribution γ∗.A h i g h e r w e i g h t β of envy implies a higher evolutionarily
stable share of altruists and a higher weight α of altruism leads to a lower
evolutionary stable share of altruists. Further, higher α ∈ (0,1) and higher
β ∈ (0,1) lead to higher material payoﬀ in the evolutionarily stable equilib-
rium.
13One can also use the standard concept of ESS to obtain a result that is
equivalent to Proposition 2. Samuelson (1997, pp. 41-42 and pp. 63-65)
suggests that a distribution ° 2 [0;1] of two types with di¤erent preferences
is interpreted as a mixed strategy, and then looks for the mixed strategy
° that is ESS.8 In the particular case here, being an altruist or an envious
person are the pure strategies. Using this approach one can use the standard
de⁄nition of ESS to characterize a mixed strategy ° for given parameters ®
and ¯ that is a unique evolutionary stable strategy.
Proposition 2z Consider the set of mixed strategies that are characterized
by the probability ° 2 [0;1] of behaving as an altruist, with exogenous weights
® and ¯ of altruism and envy. The strategy °¤ in (12) is an evolutionarily
stable strategy.
For a proof suppose player 2 chooses °. Then by (6) and (7), player 1zs
material payo¤ as an altruist is ¼A = °(B ¡ VA)=2, and his payo¤ as an
envious person is ¼E = B
1+°
2 ¡ °VA ¡
1¡°
2 VE. For ° to be the symmet-
ric equilibrium, player 1 must be indi¤erent with respect to his own choice.
Hence, setting these payo¤s equal and solving for ° yields °¤ =
VE¡B
VE¡VA. Sup-
pose a small group of mutants of mass ² invades, playing a mixed strat-
egy ^ °. Therefore, each player expects now to be matched with an altru-
ist with probability ¹ ° = (1 ¡ ²)°¤ + ²^ ° . In this population the pay-





2 VE. The strategy °¤ is evolutionarily stable if players
8Players typically do not actively randomize making a choice between altruism and
envy in a stage prior to the actual contest stage and then behave as altruists or as envi-
ous persons in a later contest, but this is also not the appropriate interpretation of the
analysis here. Samuelson (1997, p.64) relates the mapping of population shares into mixed
strategies of each single agent to Harsanyizs puri⁄cation model of mixed strategies.
14choosing °¤ have a higher payo¤ in this population than players choosing ^ °.
That is, °¤¹ ¼A+ (1¡ °¤)¹ ¼E > ^ °¹ ¼A +(1 ¡ ^ °)¹ ¼E must hold, or, equivalently,
(°
¤ ¡ ^ °)(¹ ¼A ¡ ¹ ¼E) > 0. (14)
Condition (14) holds because (°¤¡ ^ °)(¹ ¼A¡ ¹ ¼E) = 0 at ^ ° = °¤, d
d^ °(°¤¡ ^ °) =
¡1 < 0, and d
d^ °(¹ ¼A¡ ¹ ¼E) = ²
VA¡VE
2 < 0. ¤
If the growth rates of types are not a function of (10) or (11) but if the
material payo¤ that drives the evolutionary dynamics is de⁄ned di¤erently,
the results may di¤er. The result in Proposition 2 qualitatively generalizes
for some alternative de⁄nitions ofmaterial payo¤. Oneinteresting case would
be a growth rate that depends on relative payo¤
rA =
¼A





Inserting and solving for the stationary solutions reveals that the same sta-
tionary solution °¤ emerges.
An important aspect in this analysis was that players are unable to ob-
serve their opponentzs type. A type that behaves narrowly sel⁄shly (that
is, a type with ® = ¯ = 0) could successfully invade a population with any
mixture of altruists and envious individuals. If this type exists, the evolu-
tionarily stable equilibrium consists of this type ofrational players only. This
negative result is due to the fact that we assume here that individuals cannot
observe the type of their opponent, and therefore, the mechanisms that are
at work in Bester and Güth (1998) and in Frank (1987, 1988), or the group
selection mechanism outlined in Lohmann, Oechssler and Wärneryd (2001)
are not at work here.
154 Conclusions
If players are in an environment in which they frequently enter contests with
little or no noise (as described by contest success functions as in (2)), they
are better o¤ (in terms of their material payo¤) in a society in which individ-
uals are either envious or altruistic. The bene⁄t of behaving as an altruist
is higher the larger the share of envious players, and the bene⁄t of being
envious is higher the larger the share of players who behaves altruistically.
There is a share of altruists at which altruists and envious players have pre-
cisely identical material payo¤s. Populations in which the material payo¤s
of altruists and envious players determine the future population shares have
a tendency to end up with a speci⁄c mix of altruists and envious players.
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